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White farmers in South Africa, a landowning class that subordinated black 
tenants and workers, also participated in the suppression of white workers’ 
movements before and after the First World War. This article explores how class 
interest limited and then overrode the farmers’ expected ethnic and political 
solidarities. It focuses especially on the contradictory ways in which farmers related 
to the great mineworkers’ strike and rebellion of 1922. Some contemporaries 
expected that racial solidarity, Afrikaner nationalism and familial links would lead 
landowners to side, even militarily, with the white workers. Appeals were made to 
farmers by both sides of the struggle in 1922, and there was some significant support 
for the strikers from them. But the upheaval ran counter to landowners’ interests, 
notably by dislocating their primary urban market at a time of severe economic 
difficulty. In the end, farmers rode once more into the towns against the workers. 
 
More than once in early-twentieth century South Africa, the government 
mobilised Afrikaner landowners against militant urban workers. Much of the military 
force that overwhelmed a general strike by white workers in January 1914 was drawn 
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from the countryside.1 About a decade later, in 1922, there was a historic strike by 
white workers on the gold mines of the Witwatersrand, the conurbation centred on 
Johannesburg. When the strike erupted into armed insurrection, thousands of white 
farmers – these would have been military reservists organised into mounted units 
known as burger commandos – swept into action at the behest of the government. The 
air force, artillery, permanent military units, reserves not based in the countryside (for 
example, the Durban Light Infantry, the Imperial Light Horse, the Transvaal Scottish 
Regiment) as well as a militarised police force were also thrown at the rebels.2 But the 
farmers under arms constituted a substantial portion of the purely military forces that 
suppressed the rebellion.3   
This study is the first systematic exploration of how the rural masters related 
to the struggle of 1922. Beyond adding a neglected dimension to our understanding of 
a signal moment in South African history, it makes an argument of wider interest 
regarding the relationship of class to politics. For various reasons, the landowners in 
1922 were expected by many to side with the strikers and rebels.  They did so to some 
degree, but their support was limited decisively by their class differences from urban 
workers, and by the ways in which the struggle of 1922 militated against their 
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of Defence, now part of the South African Defence Force Archives, Pretoria.  
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economic interests.  The analysis, then, might be considered as something of a case-
study in how class interest shapes political response.  
There was certainly a belief that the farmers, unlike their compatriots who 
suppressed the general strike in 1914, would side with the rebellious strikers and 
thereby immeasurably strengthen the armed revolt of 1922. In the 1914 case, it is not 
surprising that Afrikaner landowners rode in against the strikers. The party then in 
power – the South African National Party led by Generals Louis Botha and Jan Smuts 
– represented the great majority of Afrikaner landowners, and the farmers could be 
expected to rally to the call of the government when its authority was challenged.  
Moreover, organised labour – this was always white labour at this time – was still 
largely associated with people of British (or British imperial) stock, the historic 
enemy of Boer/Afrikaner nationalism. Afrikaner farmers also had something of a 
suspicion of the supposed corruption of the urban world,4 the world after all 
dominated by uitlanders (foreigners) who had brought war and imperialism to the 
Boer republics.  
However, developments in the decade after the general strike of 1914 might 
have been expected to alter the relationship of many white farmers to urban militants. 
There were now substantial numbers of Afrikaners amongst the strikers. Moreover, 
there had been a notable fragmentation and re-alignment in white politics. Afrikaner 
nationalists had begun to peel away from the ruling South African National Party. In 
1914, nationalist-minded SANP MPs from the Orange Free State joined General 
Hertzog in forming the National Party. When South Africa joined Britain in the First 
World War, this so outraged many rural Afrikaners that they joined a rebellion.  This 
was crushed by the Botha-Smuts government, but led to a rising wave of Afrikaner 
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where the important findings of Sandra Swart are alluded to. 
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nationalism that spread support for Hertzog’s National Party. It now became a 
country-wide force. Moreover, by the time of the 1922 strike, the party in power, now 
called the South African Party, had fused with the pro-imperial Unionist Party, and it 
was led by General Smuts, viewed by many as a collaborator with British 
imperialism. Increasing numbers of Afrikaners were alienated from the Smuts 
government. Perhaps the farmers amongst them could no longer be counted on to 
obey its orders to scotch a workers’ rebellion.5   
Elements of this argument might be persuasive, but one should nevertheless be 
careful about supposing that Afrikaner landowners were overwhelmingly Nationalist 
supporters by this time. Indeed, even in 1924, when the South African Party lost 
power to a coalition of the National and Labour Parties, it was still getting markedly 
more votes in every province of South Africa (except for the Orange Free State) than 
the Nationalists: in the Cape, the SAP held perhaps 60% of all  parliamentary seats.6  
A fair number would have been rural.7 It is true that, by the time of the 1924 general 
election – both in the Transvaal province, where the Witwatersrand was located, and 
in the Orange Free State, whose northern reaches were close to the Rand – farmers’ 
constituencies revealed a pronounced (and sometimes overwhelming) tendency to 
incline to the National Party. But it must still be emphasised that, in the general 
election of 1921, the year before the great strike and rebellion, many rural 
constituencies in the Transvaal did not elect Nationalist parliamentarians: one of the 
great gains of the National Party in 1924 lay particularly in the Transvaal’s farming 
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constituencies.8  We must take care, then, in assuming a Nationalist grip on farmers’ 
loyalties. The most one can say with respect to the Transvaal, as opposed to the 
strongly-Nationalist Orange Free State, is that the period during and after the War saw 
growing support for the National Party amongst farmers, but that this did not become 
decisive for that party until 1924.  
Even so, when the possibility of military action against the strikers in 1922 
was discussed, there was evidently a worry that Afrikaner nationalism might affect 
the mobilization of farmers. Hence Winston Churchill, then the colonial secretary, 
was warned by the governor-general of South Africa:  
On the last similar occasion, in 1914, the Government relied largely upon the 
burghers from the districts surrounding the Rand. It is said that since then the 
attitude of these men has undergone a considerable change owing to the spread 
of Nationalism and to the fact that numbers of them now have relatives 
employed on the mines…. It has been rumoured that, if these burghers were 
called out, some would refuse service or alternatively, after enrolment, would 
range themselves on the side of the strikers.9 
 
It is noteworthy that the governor-general referred to a phenomenon other than 
nationalism that that might now lead the burger commandos from the countryside to 
side with strikers: their familial connections with miners. If, in earlier industrial 
upheavals, white strikers tended to be associated principally with people of British or 
British imperial origin, this was no longer so. Such had been the pace of Afrikaner 
urbanisation that, at the time of the 1922 strike, at least half of the strikers were 
Afrikaners: the general secretary of the white miners’ union, E. Hendrikz, was himself 
an Afrikaner. Moreover, a very high proportion of these Afrikaner mineworkers did 
indeed have ties to the countryside.  
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Their country origins were manifest in a number of ways – whether in that 
evidence of mineworkers keeping cows;10 in the way in which scores of mineworkers 
worked agricultural plots in Putfontein near Benoni, east of Johannesburg;11 and – 
most dramatically – in the very large numbers of horses that the strikers paraded on. 
When the white workers’ movement, influenced by ex-servicemen in its ranks, 
elaborated a paramilitary structure known as strike commandos (not to be confused 
with the burger commandos referred to above), these frequently had mounted 
sections.12 It was to one of these that a leader of Germiston strikers referred when he 
spoke of die perde Kommando (‘the horses Commando’) under his authority.13 That 
large numbers of mineworkers continued to keep horses – this could be costly for an 
urban worker, given costs of stabling and forage – is highly significant. The horse had 
always been a powerful cultural emblem for Afrikaner farmers. When workers held 
on to it in an urban milieu, this announced their origins on the land and the hope, 
perhaps, that they would return to it.14 
If the rural origins of many mineworkers provided a link to Afrikaner farmers 
that might lead landowners to support the strike, another factor could facilitate this. 
The strikers of 1922, the men whose movement ultimately became a rebellion against 
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the government, were fighting above all to prevent the semi-skilled amongst them – 
perhaps 10% of the white labour force – from being replaced by black workers at 
much lower wages. (The South African mining companies, worried by falling profits 
and the power of white labour, had provoked the strike by seeking to impose wage 
cuts, a reorganisation of production and a policy of racial substitution in the semi-
skilled grades.)15   Landowners, highly committed to white supremacy, were expected 
to show sympathy with the racial cause at the heart of the strike.16 As the governor-
general informed the colonial secretary: ‘The allegation that the Chamber [of Mines, 
the employers’ body] is trying to displace white men by natives may enlist the 
sympathy of the Dutch [i.e. Afrikaner] farmers, whose attitude on the colour question 
is traditional.’17 By the time this message was sent to London, a Nationalist politician 
had already told strikers at an ‘overflowing’ meeting ‘that they had the full sympathy 
of the farmers in his district in their fight for the maintenance of the colour bar’.18  
To sum up, then, there was a plausible contemporary view – held for the 
reasons sketched above – that the rural masters would show solidarity with the white 
labour movement in the year of its great struggle. This article explores the nature, 
limits and – ultimately – the violation of that solidarity.  However, before 
commencing the analysis, certain difficulties with regard to sources should be 
emphasised. The archives of the Department of Agriculture, the state institution most 
concerned with the landowners, may well have nothing on the farmers’ relationship to 
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 See Die Burger, 17 February 1922, p. 5,’Boere steun stakers’ for evidence of farmers supporting the 
racial demand of the strikers. 
17
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the strike.19 The Department of Defence files that relate to the workers’ rebellion offer 
a few tantalizing glimpses of the burger commandos but they do not deal with them 
extensively.20 (The nature of the defence records perhaps explains why A. B. 
Oberholster,  the historian who has most immersed himself in the military record, has 
little, if anything, to say about the farmers’ relationship to the strike.)21  One also has 
to look very hard elsewhere in the voluminous state records related to the upheaval of 
1922 to find references to farmers – I deploy here ones gathered in many years of 
research into a much wider project on race, class and violence.  
Gleanings from newspaper research are certainly rich.  The Afrikaans press 
provided much evidence for this study, but it is the great English-language newspaper 
of Johannesburg, the Rand Daily Mail, that has proved most useful. This 
comparatively well-resourced newspaper was published from the heart of the Rand 
during the struggle of 1922, and it offered an extraordinarily-comprehensive account 
of virtually all phenomena related to the strike. Indeed, when the Strike Legal 
Defence Committee came to offer an analysis of the upheaval, it based its ‘detailed 
chronological history’ on what the Rand Daily Mail provided.  The paper served 
capital, the committee declared, and it was given to condemning strikers, but – as it 
pointed out – ‘its reports of facts were usually correct’.22 As we shall see, the Rand 
Daily Mail detailed farmers’ aid to the strike, and it also provided evidence of the 
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difficulties the strike caused for agriculturalists in the great market of the Rand. 
However, notwithstanding the high quality of this press reporting, one must be on 
guard with respect to items ‘planted’ in the press by the employers, as also with 
respect to the exaggerations that sometimes coloured pronouncements from the 
strikers’ camp. The contending parties were, after all, engaged in something of a 
propaganda war and appeals to farmers had a place in this. 
 
I 
Opponents and supporters of the strike were certainly framing their ideological 
contest with an eye to the farmers. This can be shown in the employers’ propagation 
of the abstract and rather unconvincing idea that farmers were suffering because of 
‘the high wages paid to organised labour’. Farmers had to be able ‘to exchange 
products with those of other producers on a…fair basis’, it was argued, and they 
would never be able to do so ‘while organised labour on the railways, on the mines, 
and in town industries persist[ed] in claiming the right to be sustained…in a superior 
position to that of the farmer’.23  This argument was reiterated by the Chamber of 
Mines – the collective organisation of mining companies – which also stressed that 
the income of mineworkers ‘had risen enormously since 1914’ while that of farmers 
‘remained stationary’.24 (Actually, whilst in monetary terms, white mineworkers’ 
wages had risen markedly during the First World War, given inflation, they had, in 
real terms, remained more or less fixed between 1914 and 1920.)25 The farmers, 
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 Rand Daily Mail, 12 January 1922, p. 7, ‘Why farmers go bankrupt’, recounting views of the head of 
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member of the Chamber of Mines’.  
25
 UWL, AH646, TUCSA Records, SAIF Papers, box Bd1-5 (SAI F memoranda), document Bd3.11, J. 
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argued the Chamber opaquely, were exploited by white mine workers: ‘an unfair 
exchange of labour’ was taking place.26 
Representatives of labour, meanwhile, made their own appeal to the farmers. 
A miners’ leader in Brakpan, east of Johannesburg, described some of the work of his 
‘Propaganda Committee’: ‘We sent out men to tell the country people exactly why we 
had come out on strike, and [why we] were remaining out…’27  A leaflet in Afrikaans, 
meanwhile, included a message from a leading trade unionist, and advanced the idea 
that the strikers’ cause was in the interests of farmers. If black labour edged out 
whites on the mines, it was argued, the consequences for the farmers would be dire: 
die annvraag vir hul[lle] produkte sal verminder (‘the demand for their products will 
diminish’) and black farm labour would become prohibitively expensive.28  Indeed, 
argued the general secretary of the miners’ union, black workers would be drawn 
away from the farms as they sought new and better-paid positions once held by 
whites: ‘the backveld farmers would lose seriously in native labour, because farm 
labourers would flock to the mines to get the higher pay’.29  A defeat of the white 
workers, it was publicly declared to a crowd of strikers in Johannesburg, would mean 
that ‘the farmers must go down, too, once and for all’ for, as the strike had 
demonstrated, they depended upon a white working class market.30 This idea was 
taken up by an Afrikaner nationalist newspaper, which urged farmers to support the 
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white workers in their struggle because, it asserted, they were ‘better buyers [beterer 
kopers] …of the products of the farmer’.31   
In the speeches to strikers, the rural masters were frequently mentioned. The 
mineworkers desperately needed to hear that their cause was supported by other 
constituencies of whites, not least the farmers who had proved so potent an enemy in 
the past. Thus, when crowds of workers gathered, they were repeatedly told that the 
farmers were with them, as in a speech that referred to the “backveld” having ‘come 
up to the scratch’, realising that the employers were seeking ‘to starve the men into 
submission’; or in that address in which it was argued that the mining companies had 
been wrong footed by the ‘sympathy of the country for the townsmen’. The farmers, it 
was strongly implied, would not allow the workers to be starved back to work and the 
employers were now ‘shaking’.32  
Such speeches – with that emphasis on preventing starvation – remind us that 
the strikers needed food supplies from the farmers. This is why the leader of the 
miners’ union was described in early February 1922 as ‘leaving immediately for the 
country districts to collect foodstuffs from the farmers’.33  As one leader of strike 
commandos remarked after the workers’ movement of 1922 had been suppressed: 
‘Prominent strikers did go out into the country to collect, and held meetings all over 
the Transvaal and the Free State.’34 The strike of 1922 was, after all, no brief affair 
and the funnelling of food to the strikers and their families was crucial to sustaining it. 
This is why a trade union leader called upon the wider public to prevent the strikers 
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 Rand Daily Mail, 2 February 1922, p. 5, “Withdraw the ultimatum”;  and 1 February 1922, p. 8, 
‘Political fighting foreshadowed’. See also the reference to the farmers’ solidarity as conveyed to 
workers in the Johannesburg Town Hall: Rand Daily Mail, 3 February 1922, p. 7, ‘Distress owing to 
strike’.  
33
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from being ‘beaten by the barbarous weapon of starvation.’  He made his appeal more 
than a month into the dispute, and commented that: ‘The people of this country 
had…risen nobly to the occasion…’35 
Had the people of the countryside so nobly risen? One Labour parliamentarian 
implied that farmers, generally, were demonstrating ‘their sympathy with the strikers 
by providing them with foodstuffs’.36 According to another: ‘The Heidelberg farmers 
were placing all their cattle and…crops at the disposal of the strikers, to be paid for 
when they could. Rustenberg and other districts had made similar offers.’37 This was 
surely hyperbole. However, the National Party, which had a strong focus on farmers, 
put its weight behind provisioning the strikers. When trade union representatives met 
with the Transvaal executive of the party, they specifically ‘asked for assistance in the 
matter of food supplies’. Sympathetic to the racial demands of the strikers, the 
executive resolved ‘to give its full support [to the workers] in so far as it affects the 
supply of provisions from the country side’. A party committee was to be formed to 
receive such, and soon enough the governor-general was remarking on what was held 
to be ‘an excellent response’ to the Nationalist initiative.38 The party’s branch 
structure in the rural districts of the Transvaal appears to have been enlisted to collect 
supplies.39  
East of Johannesburg, in Germiston, farmers were certainly represented on the 
committee overseeing the relief fund aiding those fallen on hard times because of the 
strike. Close by, in the settlement of Alberton, Hans Meyer, a prominent local farmer, 
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made a speech in which he attacked the government and ‘promised the strikers…quite 
a bounteous supply of foodstuffs from the neighbouring farmers’. West of 
Johannesburg, meanwhile, in the Krugersdorp-Randfontein area, there was a ‘well-
attended meeting of farmers…at Mulder’s Drift’. A vote in support of the strikers was 
taken ‘and the farmers promised to lend assistance by giving supplies of produce’. 
Within a week, wagons trundled out of Krugersdorp to bring in sustenance from ‘the 
country districts’: it was said that ‘a most generous response’ was guaranteed.40 
Certainly, some reports do suggest a generous response. A single farmer, it 
was said, ‘had donated ten head of cattle’. Very late in January, an assembly of the 
farmers of Jackson’s Drift resolved to back the strikers with ‘moral and material 
support in every direction’; in fact, they had by then provided to the workers’ 
movement a ‘large quantity of potatoes, fruit, vegetables and meat’. It mid- February, 
it was reported that J. L van Deventer, presumably a farmer, had donated to the 
Germiston Relief Fund not only over half a dozen bags of corn and potatoes, but more 
than 30 sheep and goats.41 An Afrikaans newspaper printed a lang lys van bydrae (a 
‘long list of contributions’)  that had been made by rural folk to the strikers.42    
  
II 
A closer look at the organisation and dispensing of food to the strikers and 
their families, however, reveals a limited role played by the farmers.  For the strikers 
were overwhelmingly resourced by urban groups and organisations. The South 
African Industrial Federation, to which the various unions of mineworkers belonged, 
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rapidly set up a Central Strike Distress Fund to coordinate the distribution of food to 
those in need. It was linked to ‘various district committees’ to which foodstuffs were 
sent. Not much more than a month into the strike, the movement was already issuing 
rations for 30 000 people through a highly-organised system entailing registration, 
depots and coupons.43  Most of the cash for the Fund came from ‘trade union 
sources’. Goods in kind, then held to be worth over a fifth of the Fund’s resources, 
were contributed by ‘tradesmen and sympathisers’. And of the total resources in cash 
and kind donated to the Central Distress Fund, ‘less than 8%’ was said to ‘have come 
from the country’. Writing in mid-February 1922, a journalist who wrote admiringly 
of the organisation of relief by the strikers, spoke of a ‘little more’ having recently 
‘come in from the country’, but he referred to the ‘hopes that the frequently expressed 
sympathy of the farmers will materialise substantially’.44 The implication is that the 
assertions regarding the support of the farmers seemed out of kilter with the actual 
volume of aid so far received from them.  There was no flood of provisions. 
Of much greater importance to the strikers were urban sources of support. 
These came not only from the strata and organisations already alluded to.  The 
resources of local government could also be tapped.  In a mining town like Brakpan, 
the white community was dominated by mineworkers and they could ensure that 
municipal resources were utilized in their support.  In early March, the strike now two 
months old and burning on towards insurrection, the employers sought to evict 
strikers and their families from residences on mining property. So powerful a hold on 
the local municipality did the white working class have, that the mayor immediately 
brought to the attention of his Finance and General Purposes Committee the ‘disgust’ 
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of a ‘Mass Meeting of Citizens’.  They had condemned what was described as an 
attempt ‘to throw women and children out on the veld, at the mercy of the elements’. 
Shelter was needed for any who were evicted, and the municipal council was 
requested to take responsibility for this. Within a day of the mass meeting, the 
committee had formed a special group, including the mayor, ‘to inspect and ascertain 
if any vacant houses or shops [were]…available and…if any tents [could]…be 
leased’.45   But even before this, the local authorities in Brakpan were working with 
the strike movement to alleviate hardship: there was a ‘Municipal Fund’ to that end, 
as also official action to galvanise school boards to ‘organise the distribution of food 
to necessitous school children’.46 On the Rand in 1922, municipal support of this kind 
would have buttressed that coming from unions and urban sympathisers.  Aid from 
the countryside was helpful, but far from decisive and it was utterly dwarfed by the 
total that came from town dwellers and organisations. Much was made of rural 
support in the speeches of labour leaders because it implied wide support for the 
strike, but it was actually rather circumscribed.   
Which factors limited the farmers’ support? Firstly, we need to remember that 
Afrikaners who migrated to the Rand had failed to maintain their positions on the 
land: landlessness, the pressures of landlords commercialising their estates and 
preferring black tenants and labourers, had driven them into town. Insofar as 
Afrikaner workers retained familial connections in the countryside, they were often to 
folk who were relatively marginal and who could therefore offer them little support. 
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Moreover, all farmers were afflicted by a post-war recession and they were likely to 
view a long, disruptive strike as running counter to their interests. During the strike 
itself, the president of the Transvaal Agricultural Union (TAU) told its annual 
congress that agriculturalists had been hit very hard by ‘the cessation of work in the 
gold mines’ which was ‘paralysing their chief local market at a time when they were 
least able to bear it’.47  In fact, a sizeable number of letters was received by the TAU 
from farmers concerned about the issue.48  
It was not merely that the usual agricultural sales in the white community were 
disrupted by the strike. The mining industry itself was a major purchaser of farm 
products for the feeding of black mineworkers. But the work stoppage had led the 
companies temporarily to terminate the recruitment of black labourers to replace any 
whose contracts expired.  While most black mineworkers remained on company 
property and were paid throughout the strike, the black workforce was seriously 
depleted by the cessation of recruitment,  the endless departure of workers whose 
contracts ended, as also through the apparent right given to the employers to terminate 
contracts where black workers were ‘desirous of returning home’.49   By the end of 
January, the strike only three weeks old, the black workforce on the goldmines had 
been reduced by almost 38 000 workers.50 About three weeks later, an ‘army of 43, 
000 expatriated labourers’ was referred to and the public was reminded that no black 
migrant workers were ‘now coming into the labour districts’.51 By the time the strike 
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was almost two months old, the size of the black workforce on the Rand had been 
slashed by about 47 000.52 This would have reduced considerably the food purchases 
of the mining companies. ‘The native exodus affects the farmer and local producer 
considerably,’ declared one newspaper at a point when this exodus was set to grow. It 
then enumerated the losses suffered by producers and sellers of agricultural goods:  
It is estimated that the consumption of mealie meal in the compounds [the 
residential complexes for black workers] has been reduced by 400 or 500 
bags…per day. As the regular weekly ration of the mine boy includes 3 lbs. of 
meat, as well as ¾ lb. of “soup” meat, the farmer and butcher equally stand to 
lose. The…compound ration of vegetables normally requires a considerable 
quantity of potatoes, pumpkins, carrots, beans, and so forth. The bread bill for 
the underground native is a big item. Suppliers of all these commodities are 
affected…53 
 
To take merely one of the products mentioned above – meat. The total weekly 
ration amounted to about 4 lbs. per worker. To understand the weekly loss to farmers 
and butchers one has to multiply that figure by tens of thousands – that is, the number 
of ‘repatriated’ black workers. And to this figure must be added the losses to butchers 
and farmers resulting from the collapsing market for meat amongst the strikers. By the 
mid-point of the strike, for example, the butchers of the mining town of Benoni had to 
inform strikers who had not settled debts from the preceding month that they could no 
longer buy on credit.54  As to the ramifications of such developments even far away in 
the countryside, Die Burger could report on one livestock auction in the Cape where 
the sellers evidently would not agree to sell anything omdat die pryse so laag was  
(‘because the prices were so low’).  The reason given for the paltry amounts offered 
by potential buyers? The strike.55 
It is possible that some press reports regarding the strike’s impact on farmers 
were propaganda placed by the mining companies, which historically had powerful 
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connections to newspapers of the Witwatersrand.56 Business archives disclose that the 
employers spent a great deal on propaganda during the strike: some individuals 
received what were substantial sums for the day – in one case 250 guineas; in another, 
400 guineas – ‘for their services in regard to propaganda’ . And after the strike, the 
employers were required to provide £10 000 to their representative organisation ‘to 
meet the expenses of the Propaganda Sub-committee’.57 Scores upon scores of 
interventions were drafted, some specifically addressed to farmers’ concerns.58 
Certain anonymous letters in the press ostensibly from farmers pressed the case for 
not supporting the strikers or asserted that the overwhelming bulk of white 
agriculturalists in the Transvaal were ready ‘to obey the legally constituted authority 
of the country when called upon’.59 That was a way of announcing that the farmers 
would be ready once more to ride in to suppress the strikers. There is something 
suspiciously tailor-made about such anonymous letters, not least because one can 
demonstrate that a letter of this kind could specifically counter sentiments in support 
of the strikers that were earlier reported in the same newspaper.60  And, certainly, one 
Rand Daily Mail report headed ‘Giving the stuff away’ (sub-title: ‘Farmers’ 
complaints about Rand strike’) was so crafted as to raise suspicions that it was serving 
a propaganda function. After citing a farmer talking of ‘the impossibility of selling 
any kind of produce’ at a profit, the article closed off with this alleged quote from 
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him: ‘The disturbed state of affairs on the Rand has added to the troubles of the 
farmer a hundredfold, and it is hard to see who expects to benefit by the strike.’61 
This kind of report may have been placed by the companies. However, there is 
a great deal more information (some of it already cited) that appeared in the press 
which cannot be explained away as propaganda. It suggests just how worrying the 
strike would have been for farmers, and it could appear en passant in the course of 
reportage not specifically focused on farmers, or in the course of commercial 
reporting for the benefit of buyers and sellers in the Johannesburg market.  To give 
some examples: the strike of 1922 was also one of coal miners and, even before the 
workers on the goldfields came out, union members were instructed by their umbrella 
federation not to utilize coal designated as scab. There was something of a flashpoint 
regarding the question in the Vereeniging area south of Johannesburg early in January 
1922, where it looked as if power generation might be radically affected. A report on 
the question contained a throwaway line on the ‘uneasy feeling amongst the farming 
population’ that they might be set ‘to lose their markets’.62  
The reporting of commerce in the regular Rand Daily Mail column, ‘The 
Johannesburg markets’, pointed to how the struggle of 1922 troubled buyers and 
sellers of agricultural goods. Trade did, of course, continue but there are many reports 
which reveal the impact of the strike. At one point, there was ‘a sudden collapse’ in 
the cattle market. The quality of beasts brought to market was one reason, but it was 
not the only one, for even animals described as ‘good mediums’ drew virtually no 
bids. As the report ran:  ‘Butchers bought only for bare necessities, and speculators 
who despatch cattle to other centres did no business at all. In fact, many of the big 
buyers were absent from the market.  This, of course, is directly due to the labour 
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troubles.’63 Later on, the market was reported to be suffering to such a degree that any 
farmers who were able to do so were advised to ‘keep back their stock and produce’. 
‘As the strike continues so does business become worse’, it was stated: ‘Farmers are 
feeling the effects of the industrial troubles severely.’64 There were days at market 
during this time that ‘old hands’ would consider the worst in memory.65  It was also 
reported that there had been a colossal reduction in purchases of fruit on the Rand – 
‘the elimination of the Johannesburg market’ was actually referred to. This had 
combined with economic difficulties in the diamond mining centre of Kimberley and 
a bounteous fruit harvest to create the most acute difficulties for sellers of fruit from 
the Western Cape. Other markets were sought, most notably Port Elizabeth, but the 
situation was dire, with fruit prices sinking dramatically.66 
 Moreover, this disruption of the agricultural market by the strike was afflicting 
white farmers who were already sorely tried by an acute economic crisis. Helen 
Bradford has most powerfully demonstrated just how crushing the economic situation 
was for white farmers in the 1920s generally: the terms of trade had swung severely 
against agricultural producers, and prices had declined considerably in the war and 
post-war years.67 As the strike on the gold mines began, an Afrikaans newspaper 
quoted an official publication to the effect that the income of farmers had ‘sunk 
lower’ (lager gedaald) than their expenditure.68  Die Burger, a Nationalist newspaper 
that supported the strikers, was emphatic in pointing to the inability of the country to 
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soak up its agricultural production; and it warned early on that the work stoppage 
would rapidly affect farmers dependent on the Johannesburg market.  When the same 
newspaper ran a giant advertisement placed by the mining employers that was 
addressed to farmers and that reminded them that the gold-mining zone was the 
country’s greatest market, and which asserted that the strike was threatening it with 
catastrophe, it may given many farmers pause for thought. 69   
In these circumstances most farmers would have been impatient with urban 
movements that made matters worse for them. Reuters reported from one rural area: 
‘the public in this district show no sympathy with the strikers’ because of ‘the low 
price of agricultural products’ then obtaining. The report came during a very early 
stage of the stoppage, and yet – even then – the view expressed by the whites of the 
district was a desire for the strike to end immediately.70 An exceptionally angry – but 
anonymous -   letter in the press came from a Transvaal farmer and may have been 
invented and placed in the Rand Daily Mail by the employers. However, when it 
poured scorn on the idea of provisioning urban ‘hot-heads’, and spoke of how even a 
good number of better-off farmers had been ‘completely broken’ by the economic 
situation, and that others were mortgaged to the hilt, it was speaking a language that a 
great many farmers would have understood.71 Like the best propaganda, this letter 
pointed to facts.  
 The farmers were a rural master class who lorded it over black tenants and 
workers, but many of them were struggling members of such a class, and it is clear 
that a common view amongst them was that the white mineworkers were a rather 
prosperous lot. A. J. Venter, a farmer in the Northern Transvaal who had once been 
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employed on the mines, complained that the working hours of the farmer were longer 
than those of the white mineworker; that, unlike that worker, he had no guaranteed 
annual leave, and – he reminded – his readers:  Hier kan jij nie staak nie… (‘Here you 
can’t strike…’).72  In a speech before a few thousand people on the east Rand during 
the strike, Tielman Roos, the leader of the Transvaal National Party and a man 
sympathetic to the strikers, felt compelled to tell his audience that: ‘The country 
people were led to believe that the miners earned enormous sums in wages; it would 
be an eye-opener to these people if the miners gave publicity to their actual 
earnings.’73 
It is not clear that this would have convinced a farmer such as A. van Graan, 
despite the fact that he must have lived relatively near white mining communities – he 
came from the district of Krugersdorp. So far as he was concerned, the strike was 
calamitous to farmers and, he believed, it was engaged in by people who generally 
procured a higher income than them.74 The struggling landowner was a common 
image, which is why an Afrikaner nationalist newspaper during the strike stressed the 
hard life of the ‘thousands and thousands’ of farmers whose toil went unrewarded.75 
Such people would not necessarily be sympathetic to the white mineworkers. Perhaps 
a belief in their prosperity explains why, in Cradock in the Eastern Cape, farmers met 
together – a Nationalist MP in their midst – and condemned the mineworkers’ 
objectives as ‘unreasonable’.76 The mining companies, of course, were wont to rub in 
the idea of the high-rolling white mineworker. 
Another, more complex, part of the farmers’ consciousness and position needs 
to be emphasised. The white workers overwhelmingly made their appeal to the 
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farmers on a racial basis: after the suppression of the strike, it was affirmed in court 
that the strikers, in procuring provisions from the rural areas, ‘always represented’ 
their cause ‘to the country side’ as a struggle ‘for a “white South Africa”’.77  That 
struggle was construed in terms of ensuring that black labour did not displace white 
labour on the mines.  But the farmers’ attitude to white labour was not that different 
from the mine managers’. Commercial farming in South Africa, as much as mining, 
depended upon cheap, black labour. Generally, farmers would avoid using white 
labour where they could use black.  The mining companies’ intention to substitute 
black for white workers at far lower wages expressed a logic that virtually every white 
farmer could appreciate. Indeed, white farmers commanded an economic regime that 
had taken this logic to its extreme. One sixth of the wage workers in the mining sector 
were white; the proportion of white wage workers in agriculture was so miniscule as 
to be barely discernible. If one was looking for a sector of the South African economy 
from which white wage workers had been more or less completely excluded by 
employers, it was agriculture. 
This point was rubbed home during the strike in a propaganda initiative 
damned by one newspaper as a lompe bedrog  (a ‘clumsy deceit’).78 Actually, the 
initiative, clearly sponsored by the mining companies, was rather clever. In mid-
February 1922, a pamphlet in both English and Dutch (or Afrikaans, presumably) 
‘circulated…throughout the country districts’. It was ‘An Appeal To Farmers’ from a 
bogus organisation (‘The National-White Labour Party of South Africa’) and it 
cunningly used the discourse of the strike to ram home the fact that the mining 
companies were being asked to support white labour on a basis that farmers would 
                                                 
77
 SCC, case No. 1/1922, Rex v. R. P. Erasmus: testimony of A. Trigger, divisional criminal 
investigation officer; my italics. The quoted words are those of the lawyer questioning Trigger, who 
endorsed them.   
78
 The declaration is from Ons Vaderland, cited in Die Burger, 18 February 1922, p. 8, ‘’N vervalste 
vlugskrif’ (sub-heading). It is not clear if the words are a quotation. 
 24
never tolerate. For it called on farmers to contribute to the ‘struggle to make South 
Africa a white man’s country’ by identifying black employees whom they could 
replace with white workers; those workers were then to be paid ‘a fair living wage’, 
even if one ‘substantially below that which the Chamber of Mines now offers’.  All 
that was required was ‘about twenty pounds per month, together with board and 
lodging for each white man employed’. If the farmers could right away offer such 
conditions to strikers, they were to inform the party, which would soon be pressing for 
appropriate legislation. What the party hoped ‘to see [was] every mine and every farm 
in South Africa supporting the largest number of white men it possibly can employ’.  
The federation to which the mineworkers’ union belonged immediately condemned 
the pamphlet as ‘issued by the agents of the Chamber of Mines’; and it also sought to 
reassure farmers that agriculture was a sector that organised labour considered exempt 
from a demand that the ratio of whites to blacks employed be commensurate with 
their proportions in the South African population as a whole.79  
 
III  
To understand the complex and varied responses of farmers to the Rand strike 
of 1922, we must concede that in some instances nationalist politics, ethnic solidarity, 
familial links, social concern, or a shared commitment to the ideology of ‘a White 
South Africa’ led farmers to send provisions to the workers. Not all of these factors 
needed to operate in order for some solidarity to be shown. One did not, for example, 
have to be an Afrikaner nationalist to act charitably: farmers in a district which was 
said to support the South African Party were described as being in simpatie met die 
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stakers  (‘in sympathy with the strikers’).80 Nationalism, however, was likely to 
buttress support by landowners. There were evidently many Afrikaner workers who 
originally hailed from the Orange Free State, a nationalist stronghold, and it was held 
that generous aid to the strikers came from this area. According to the man who gave 
this evidence, support from the countryside generally was rising as the strike wore 
on.81  
On the other hand, we should remember that the farmers’ preference for 
utilizing black labour instead of white was actually even stronger than that of the 
mining companies, and that this preference was motivated by similar concerns: above 
all, a desire for a labour force that was cheap, unorganised, and politically 
undefended.  The logic of what the mining companies were proposing in 1922 must 
have been readily intelligible to many farmers. We should also be careful about 
assuming that Afrikaner nationalism might dictate an overwhelming solidarity on the 
part of nationalists with the white workers’ movement of 1922. It is perhaps 
significant that Die Huisgenoot, a publication with a transparently Afrikaner 
nationalist ethos and project, didn’t carry a single article on the strike in the months in 
which it proceeded. Indeed, it had barely a mention of mineworkers at all.82 During 
the work stoppage, a cartoon in Die Burger, the pre-eminent Nationalist newspaper, 
warned against what it saw as a government-employer ruse to trap the National Party 
in the revolutionary possibilities of the strike.83 The fact is that the struggle on the 
mines did not sit simply or easily with nationalism. Those addressing the meetings of 
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workers in 1922 certainly attempted at times to bring nationalism into the struggle – 
hence their references to the historical mythology of Afrikaner nationalism: the 
trekkers of the nineteenth century, the defeat of the Zulu leader Dingane.84 However, 
very substantial numbers of the workers – perhaps as many as 50% – and a high 
proportion of their leaders were not Afrikaners. Moreover, a class ideology strongly 
inflected by racism – rather than nationalism – was the dominant discourse of the 
strike, at least if the speeches to workers are taken as a guide.85  Tielman Roos, the 
Transvaal Nationalist leader, may have pronounced upon a desire for workers and 
farmers to rule South Africa ‘through means of the National Party’ (deur  middel van 
die Nasionale Partij).86 But Nationalists would have been fully aware that organised 
white labour on the Rand could net yet be approached principally through the aims 
and objectives of Afrikaner nationalism. Attempts to create an Afrikaner nationalist 
trade union on the mines during the First World War had failed. Moreover, we need to 
be very careful about extrapolating a worker-farmer alliance from the emerging 
electoral pact between the party most associated with organised workers, the Labour 
Party, and the National Party. 
Both of these parties had strong reasons to oppose General Smuts’s 
government. For the Labour Party, Smuts was strongly associated with repressive 
action against white labour. This was the man who had successfully deployed the 
army against a general strike in 1914, who had detained leading figures of the Labour 
Party and illegally deported union leaders.87 He was seen – with justice – as taking 
sides with the employers in 1922.  For the National Party, Smuts was inextricably 
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associated with British imperialism, the reviled enemy of Afrikaner nationalism.  He 
was the man who had led South African forces in support of the British during the 
First World War, who had seen off an Afrikaner rebellion in 1914-15, and whose 
South African Party had absorbed a party (the Unionists) that strongly supported the 
Empire.  But neither the National Party nor the Labour Party could put Smuts out of 
government. They needed each other. Their emerging alliance – it proved electorally 
successful in 1924 – should not be taken to imply Labour’s ideological support for the 
Afrikaner nationalist project, or the National Party’s support for the militant struggles 
of white labour. Certainly, we should not assume that the electoral coming together of 
the Nationalist and Labour Parties implied that the farmers amongst the Nationalists 
viewed the interests of workers and themselves as similar. Even Die Burger, despite 
its support of the strike, subconsciously betrayed a lack of conviction in positing the 
notion of such common interests. The very idea, it noted, must have seemed odd to its 
readers: ‘how strange it must sound‘ (hoe vreemd dit mag klink), it declared.88   
Above all, we must recognise that farmers – whether or not they sympathised 
with the workers, and whether they supported Smuts’s South African Party or 
Hertzog’s National Party – stood to lose a great deal from the Rand strike: their 
economic situation was already very difficult in the early-1920s and the strike entailed 
a reduction in their market. When the Rand strike became the Rand Revolt, then, and 
the government sought to mobilize farmers for action against the strikers, it was in the 
class interests of the farmers to suppress the workers. Perhaps this was one reason 
why General Smuts, the prime minister, was confident that the reservists from the 
countryside – the burger commandos – could be counted on: ‘We could…get 
thousands of suitable men from rural areas’, he declared, as the strike was about to 
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enter its last weeks. Later, on the eve of the workers’ rebellion, he supported the 
calling up of men from ‘surrounding districts’ and expressed himself in terms that 
suggest he felt no possibility of the farmers inclining to the workers’ cause for any 
reason whatever: ‘we shall have the most loyal support of the burghers in this 
crisis’.89  
The workers in 1922, of course, hoped that the farmers would not ride in to 
suppress them: a union leader recalled the workers’ awareness of how strikers had 
been ‘roughly treated’ by the burger commandos in the past.90 In fact, in the early 
days of the strike, there was certainly a fear on the part of organised labour that the 
farmers might once more be mobilized against them. This is surely what accounts for 
that early attempt of the general secretary of the miners’ union to dissuade farmers 
from coming into town in order to maintain order. It is true that this was framed in 
terms of racial order: organised labour was perfectly capable of dealing with any 
disturbances that arose amongst the black population, it was asserted, and ‘the farmers 
have no need [die boere nie nodig het nie] to leave their farms for such a purpose.91   
But this was really a coded call to the farmers not to obey any government call to ride 
into the towns as they had done before. It was tantamount to saying: ‘Stay away. We 
don’t really trust you.’  
However, as the strike wore on and as it was seen as more and more likely to 
lead to a test of arms, the farmers came to be viewed by the most desperate and 
committed of the strikers as a source of potential military support. Hadn’t they 
received foodstuffs from the farmers? And hadn’t the leaders of the workers endlessly 
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assured them of support from the countryside? Given this, it is hardly surprising that 
some in the labour movement came to believe that, when their rising began, the 
farmers would turn upon the government forces. At a meeting of military leaders of 
strikers – this was a week before the rebellion of 1922 – the possibility of the rapid 
arrival of military aid from the rural areas was mooted; should this occur, it was 
implied, the appropriate military strategy was to hold the urban zone until these 
reinforcements arrived: ‘you have to keep the town until assistance comes from the 
country’.92 On the day before the rebellion, a key strike commando leader in 
Johannesburg –  Rasmus P. Erasmus – made a speech to his fellow workers in which 
he declared ‘that he had just returned from [the] Free State where seventeen thousand 
Burghers were ready to come and help the strikers’; the prime minister, he declared, 
was all but defeated.93 This belief turned out to be millenarian.  Insofar as farmers 
came to Johannesburg, they came in support of General Smuts.  
During the rebellion of 1922, when a force of burger commandos under Piet 
de la Rey passed through Krugersdorp, a mining town to the west of Johannesburg, 
local citizens – evidently strikers or their supporters – congregated about them, calling 
them ‘Bloodhounds’ (Bloedhonden) and asking: ‘Are you going to shoot your 
brothers[?]’94 This appeal had no effect whatever on dissuading the burgers from 
engaging in the military drive upon the rebellious strikers. Indeed, in the operations 
against the workers, these forces from the countryside were to play an important role 
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in the western Witwatersrand, and they also participated in the campaigns in the east 
and in Johannesburg itself. Their casualties were light, but the effect of their 
deployment was great: on the East Rand, where the armed insurrection was initially 
formidable, the fact that the burger commandos had arrived in the zone was held to be 
fundamental to the rebels losing heart.95 And the rural masters under arms were to be 
particularly saluted by the more conventional military forces when they made their 
appearance in central Fordsburg, the last significant stronghold of the workers’ 
rebellion. Here ‘a big contingent of burghers.…were greeted by their comrades in 
arms, both in blue and in khaki, with resounding cheers. All sides doffed hats and 
helmets…’.96  
To understand why farmers rode in against white workers in 1922, perhaps we 
need to consider that, by the end of the strike of that year, many farmers had had 
enough of the upheaval that was exacerbating their economic distress. This factor 
might have been considered by that historian who has found it so ‘surprising’ 
(verrassend) that rural commandos, said to have been Nationalists, so readily 
participated in the drive against the rebellious workers.97 As the strike entered its 
eighth week, the prime minister was informed by one intimately involved in the 
deployment of forces against the strikers that ‘Feeling in [the] country districts [of 
the] Transvaal [was] changing materially.’ The next line, conveyed in an idiomatic if 
sometimes archaically-spelled Afrikaans, made clear that there were farmers (called 
Party boere in the telegram) who had simply lost patience with the strikers: ons het 
eers aardappels gestuur, they said (i.e. ‘we first sent potatoes), nou word dit tijd om 
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blaauw boontjes te stuur (‘now it’s time to send ounces of lead’).98  Perhaps there was 
more than a little truth in the words of Kommandant S. P. Kloppers who had earlier 
written to the prime minister from what seems to have been a farm, Leeuwpoort, in 
the Rustenburg area of the Transvaal. He noted the reports of rural aid to the strikers. 
Nevertheless, he was convinced that both supporters of Smuts’s party and the 
National Party would, if it came to it, obey the summons om wet en orde te handhaaf  
(‘to uphold law and order’).99 He had every right to this confidence: a month earlier, 
even Nationalists were being advised by one of their leaders that maintaining order 
was die plig van die Regering (‘the duty of the Government’) and if the burgers were 
called to arms on that basis, they were to answer it.100  
At any rate, when the government began to mobilize its forces, it was evident 
that it could count on help from the rural areas. There is a little evidence that the 
authorities investigated an accusation – it was denied – that a farmer had been 
discouraged on nationalist grounds from enlisting against the strikers.101 But the state 
record generally discloses something else: a pleasure in the farmers’ response. 
‘Regiments filling up fast’, the prime minister was informed by telegram on the day 
before the workers’ rebellion, ‘and volunteers even from country districts [are] 
coming up well.’102 And during the rebellion itself a member of the cabinet was 
informed that the burger commandos were ‘mobilizing fast’.103 Indeed, the nationalist 
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press reported a ‘Splendid turn out’ (Pragtige opkoms) on their part; it went on to 
assert that even a participant in the`Afrikaner Rebellion of 1914 was in their ranks.104  
As has been shown, the factors that divided the countryside from the town, the 
rural masters from the urban militants, were as powerful as those that seemed to press 
them into an alliance. Given their economic interests, most farmers – even those who 
didn’t ride in to suppress the workers’ rebellion – were probably relieved when the 
strike of 1922 was ended.  The South African farmers’ relationship to this workers’ 
struggle suggests just how important it is for the historian to assess carefully the 
bearing of class interests upon landowners’ responses to urban movements. For in the 
end, those interests trumped the ethnic and political factors that had seemed likely to 
dictate the landowners’ response. 
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